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DOES IT MATTER WHAT WE SAY  
ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION? 
Karen Petroski* 
 
Despite a common interest in justifying their scholarly output, legal academics have 
resisted seeing how their work is molded by the institutional environment in which it is produced, 
and not just by legal doctrine, ideology, or individual perspectives.  This paper presents a case 
study from this neglected perspective, considering the shape of scholarship on legal 
interpretation in light of the social conditions of its production.  After a brief discussion of the 
debates over whether scholarship (and which scholarship) matters, the paper explores how such 
concerns are addressed in various academic accounts of scholars’ textual practices.  It then 
offers some initial conclusions from an original study of the 154 most-cited articles on legal 
interpretation published in American law reviews.  Early framings of the subject shaped later 
work in familiar ways.  But the patterns disclosed by the citation relationships among the articles 
suggest some surprising conclusions.  Scholars working in the area seem to understand their 
contributions in a way that is at odds with the institutional dynamics of their efforts.  These 
patterns further indicate that legal academics’ failure to develop a specifically legal scholarly 
discourse, in some respects a strength of legal scholarship, may carry seldom-noted risks in 
work on this topic.   
 
CONTENTS 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 2 
I.  The Debate Over the Value of Scholarship .......................................................................... 3 
A. A Brief Introduction to the Debate Over Legal Scholarship ........................................... 3 
B. The Debate Over the Academy ........................................................................................ 6 
C. Special Features of the Legal Academy ........................................................................... 7 
II.  Academic Inquiry as a Social Phenomenon ...................................................................... 10 
A. Social Science Accounts of Academic Inquiry .............................................................. 10 
1. Conceptual and Participant-Based Approaches .......................................................... 10 
2. Network and Bibliometric Approaches ...................................................................... 13 
B. The Analysis of Text Networks in Legal Scholarship ................................................... 17 
III.  The Paths of Legal Interpretation Scholarship ................................................................. 21 
A. Progenitors:  Thayer and Holmes ................................................................................... 21 
B. The Withering of Interest in Contract Interpretation ..................................................... 25 
C. The Chevron Phenomenon ............................................................................................. 26 
IV.  Citation Patterns and Practices ........................................................................................ 29 
A. Cross-Citation and Embeddedness................................................................................. 30 
B. Macro-Patterns and Micro-Rhetoric ............................................................................... 32 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 34 
Appendices .............................................................................................................................. 35 
 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to Richard Delgado and Anders Walker 
for helpful comments and suggestions. 
18-Feb-11] LEGAL INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP 2 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Concerns about the value of legal scholarship have been around a long time.  In part, such 
concerns are symptoms of a recurring crisis in Western higher education.  In part, however, they 
are specific to the legal academy, which generates a growing volume of scholarship each year1 
and occupies a unique position in American higher education, with traditionally close ties to the 
nonacademic world of legal practice and politics.   
Debates about the value of scholarship on the subject of legal interpretation have not 
always been as contentious; there is some indication that nonacademic legal professionals find 
such scholarship directly relevant to their work.2  But the question is as acute in this subject area 
as any other.  Indeed, some legal scholarship addressing issues of interpretation may be not 
useless, but positively counterproductive.  The specific nature of this risk becomes clearest if we 
consider not only the effects that legal scholarship has on the nonacademic world—the 
traditional focus of arguments concerning the value of legal scholarship—but also the conditions 
of production of that scholarship, especially as those conditions are legible in the material 
records of scholarly efforts, scholarly publications themselves.  
The first half of this paper contextualizes this inquiry.  Part I outlines the debate over the 
value of scholarship, briefly describing its history in the legal context, its analogues in wider 
debates about the role of the academy, and the institutional peculiarities of the legal academy that 
complicate the debates in this context.  Part II explores approaches to critical analysis of the 
production of scholarship, especially the patterns exhibited by scholarly textual practices, 
including citation.  The focus is on approaches previously neglected in legal scholars’ self-
analysis, especially from the fields of sociology, information science, and communications.  
Curiously, despite legal academics’ acute self-awareness, sustained desire to legitimate their 
                                                 
1 For example, the Hein Online journal database indexed 33,847 articles in 2008, 12,342 in 1968, 4,629 in 1928, 
and 1,734 in 1908. 
2 See Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars:  Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the 
Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 872, 882-83 (1996) (finding that scholarship on statutory 
interpretation more frequently appears on lists of articles most cited by both judges and legal academics than 
scholarship on other topics); see also Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of a Decade of Statutory Interpretation 
Scholarship on Judicial Rulings:  An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU L. REV. 9, 11-14, 20-22 (2000) (confirming 
conclusions of Merritt & Putnam).  But see Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation (draft 
Aug. 29, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669381 (arguing that scholarly debates about constitutional 
interpretation have “low stakes,” i.e., little likelihood of affecting adjudicated outcomes).     
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scholarly efforts, and comfort with interdisciplinary work, the forms of bibliometric analysis 
used to study disciplinary structures outside law have rarely been trained on the legal field, and 
never by legal scholars.   
The second half of the paper explores specific features of legal scholarship in a particular 
research area.  Based on an original study of the 154 most-cited articles on general topics in legal 
interpretation published in American law reviews from the nineteenth century on, Part III begins 
with a description of the field.  Two pieces, an 1893 article by James Bradley Thayer and an 
1899 essay by Oliver Wendell Holmes, defined themes that have shaped the content and 
rhetorical tactics of the literature down to the present.  Part III also examines two developments 
not anticipated in these pieces:  the withering of interest in contract interpretation, at least 
described as such, after the 1960s, and the explosion, a few decades later, of interest in judicial 
deference to agency interpretations.  Part IV focuses on features of the citation network created 
by the articles.  These features support considering legal interpretation a coherent “interest area” 
but also suggest special, seldom-remarked peculiarities of the area.  Among other things, the 
patterns disclosed by the network suggest that academics working in this area may not well 
understand the social and cultural dynamics of their efforts, and that as they respond to the 
institutional pressures inherent in their position, they erode their own claims to expertise in 
unexpected ways.  
 
I.  THE DEBATE OVER THE VALUE OF SCHOLARSHIP 
A.  A Brief Introduction to the Debate Over Legal Scholarship 
Academic law reviews, the primary publication outlet for the writing of law professors, 
emerged in something like their current form in the last few decades of the nineteenth century.3  
Legal professionals and academics almost immediately questioned the value of their contents.  
By 1906, when the Index to Legal Periodicals cited a mere 60 sources (compared to 1,025 
today), a commentator had already called the law review field “overcrowded” and noted that the 
                                                 
3 On the emergence of law reviews, see especially Michael I. Swygert & Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, 
Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 739 (1985); see also Bernard 
J. Hibbitts, Last Writes? Reassessing the Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 615 (1996). 
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reviews published little of “interest” to most “practicing lawyers.”4   
The legal realists carried this critique through the first few decades of the twentieth 
century.  The best-known realist-affiliated attack was Fred Rodell’s 1930 article Goodbye to Law 
Reviews.5  Rodell emphasized the formality and narrow subject-matter of the articles published 
in law reviews, and his complaints were echoed by some judges, including Oliver Wendell 
Holmes.6  The same features criticized by Rodell, however, made at least some academic legal 
writing attractive to lawyers and judges.7  And over the first half of the twentieth century, 
judicial opinions cited law review articles more and more often.8  Celebrated examples of 
influential scholarship include Samuel D. Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 1890 article describing a 
legal right to privacy9 and the Supreme Court’s reliance, in the 1938 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins10 
decision, on Charles E. Warren’s study of an eighteenth-century statute to overrule a nearly 
century-old Supreme Court precedent.11  
The nature of critiques of legal scholarship shifted later in the twentieth century.  Some 
judges, defending legal scholarship, have continued to sound familiar themes regarding the 
                                                 
4 Frederic C. Woodward, Editorial Notes, 1 ILL. L. REV. 39, 39 (1906), discussed in Howard Denemark, How 
Valid Is the Often-Repeated Accusation That There Are Too Many Legal Articles and Too Many Law Reviews?, 30 
AKRON L. REV. 215, 217 (1996).    
5 Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1937).   
6 Charles E. Hughes described both Holmes’s attitude and its eventual eclipse:   “[T]hirty years ago Mr. Justice 
Holmes would refer somewhat scornfully to the ‘notes’ in law school reviews which ventured . . . to criticise 
pronouncements of the Supreme Court. . . .  But . . . there has been a growing regard for these ‘notes’ as helpful 
analyses of decisions.”  Charles E. Hughes, Foreword, 50 YALE L.J. 737, 737 (1941). 
7 See id.; see also Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
FROM AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LEGAL PERIODICALS ix (Assoc. of Am. L. Sch. ed., 1931) (“[L]eadership in the 
march of legal thought has been passing in our day from the benches . . . to the chairs of universities. . . .”); 
Frederick Evan Crane, Law School Reviews and the Courts, 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1935); Learned Hand, Have 
the Bench and Bar Anything to Contribute to the Teaching of Law?, 24 MICH. L. REV. 466, 466, 467 (1926). 
8 See, e.g., Douglass B. Maggs, Concerning the Extent to Which the Law Review Contributes to the 
Development of the Law, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189 (1930); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United 
States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (1959); Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional 
Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1359-80 
(2001) (discussing history of and shifts in Supreme Court citation of legal academic work). 
9 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  On the 
influence of this article, see, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing, 39 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 313, 316 (1989).  
10 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
11 Charles E. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 
(1923).  For a discussion of the influence of Warren’s article on Erie, see, e.g., Newland, supra note 8, at 481-82.  A 
more recent example, almost as often noted, is the influence on due process doctrine of Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964), discussed in, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 893 
(2009).  
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experimentation inherent in the system of production of this scholarship and the resulting wealth 
of ideas it may offer.12  But changes in the academy have made new kinds of skepticism 
possible.  Increased self-awareness about interdisciplinary scholarship has generated dispute 
about the standards appropriate to the evaluation of legal scholarship and the extent to which 
interdisciplinary efforts by law professors remain “legal.”13  And both interdisciplinary work and 
more traditional pieces focusing exclusively on legal doctrine appear to some critics to betray a 
growing disparity in interests and expertise between practicing lawyers and legal academics.14   
Aided by machine-searchable databases, some legal scholars have also sought to justify 
their work in new ways, in particular by taking judicial citations of legal scholarship as a 
measure of the scholarship’s value.  In general, the findings of such studies support the critics of 
legal scholarship; in most respects, citations of legal scholarship by courts and by legal scholars 
follow different patterns, indicating that academics value different forms of scholarship than 
judges do.15  But judges and legal academics do tend to cite similar articles in certain subject 
areas, including legal interpretation, and specifically, statutory interpretation.16  The conventional 
explanation of this phenomenon17 is that on this topic (along with constitutional law topics), 
scholars’ interest in theory18 converges with judges’ and lawyers’ interest in principles directly 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Stanley H. Fuld, A Judge Looks at the Law Review, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 915, 916 (1953) (observing 
that “the ‘fantastically non-utilitarian’ law review type brief, exhaustive and analytical, affording a broad vista of the 
law, serves as a real aid to judicial decision”); Kaye, supra note 9, at 315; Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about 
Legal Scholarship, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295, 295 (2000) (describing himself as “big fan of legal scholarship”).  
13 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1996); Philip C. 
Kissam, The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship, 63 WASH. L. REV. 221, 252-54 (1988); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond 
Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889 (1992). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. $639,558 in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., 
concurring) (“[M]any of our law reviews are dominated by rather exotic offerings of increasingly out-of-touch 
faculty members. . . .”).  See also Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the 
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); Ellen A. Peters, Reality and the Language of the Law, 90 Yale L.J. 
1193, 1193 (1981); Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge’s Response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 307-08 (1987); Patricia M. Wald, Teaching the Trade:  An Appellate Judge’s View of 
Practice-Oriented Legal Education, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 73, 44 (1986) (expressing “worry about law reformers 
who do not know how the law works”).   
15 Courts, for example, cite more articles on state law, fewer articles from critical legal studies perspectives, 
more articles from less elite reviews, and more articles from nonscholarly authors (practitioners, judges) than legal 
scholars do.  Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2, at 885-96. 
16 Id. at 802, 882-83.  See also Crespi, supra note 2, at 11-14, 20-22. 
17 See Crespi, supra note 2, at 9-10; Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2, at 882. 
18 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Howard J. Larsen & Carol J. Hodne, Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law 
Practice, and Legal Scholarship?:  A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation Apart, 30 
SUFFOLK L. REV. 353, 370 (1996) (concluding that law review articles have been growing increasingly theoretical 
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applicable in legal reasoning.19  As the discussion below suggests, this explanation, while 
reasonable, fails to account for other troublesome features of the scholarship in this area.  
 
B.  The Debate Over the Academy 
Many concerns about the value of legal scholarship parallel anxieties about the functions 
of higher education generally.  These anxieties are as old as Western culture but assumed many 
of their modern characteristics in the twentieth century.20  The debate concerns the social 
function of the university, and more especially the legitimacy of academics’ activities, including 
the scholarship they produce.  It is largely carried on in instrumentalist terms:  what norms 
should we use to assess the activities and output of universities and academics?  And it is often 
structured around an opposition between a traditional set of disciplines and values associated 
with culture, the humanities, and the arts, on the one hand, and a more explicitly instrumental set 
of values associated with the sciences and applied technical fields, on the other. 
The arts-sciences opposition in its current form is often credited to the English physicist 
and novelist C.P. Snow’s mid-twentieth-century account of the “two cultures,” which he 
identified with literary studies and the sciences.21  Snow lamented the “mutual incomprehension” 
between the two cultures, identified the sciences as the only site of genuine intellectual and 
social progress, and urged greater political support and resources for the development of the 
academic sciences.22  In a public debate with Snow, the Cambridge literary critic F.R. Leavis 
criticized Snow’s identification of literary culture with political power and argued for the 
transformative power of the humanities.23     
A series of analogous debates has played out in the United States over the second half of 
the twentieth century as the academy has weathered several bitter crises.  In the 1960s, these 
                                                                                                                                                             
since the 1960s). 
19 See sources cited supra note 2; see also, e.g., Thomas L. Ambro, Citing Legal Articles in Judicial Opinions:  
A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 547, 547 (2006). 
20 See GERARD DELANTY, CHALLENGING KNOWLEDGE:  THE UNIVERSITY IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 1-11 
(2001). 
21 C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND A SECOND LOOK (1963).  Snow originally delivered his lecture on the 
topic in 1959 at the University of Cambridge.  For a discussion of the debate in context, see Guy Ortolano, Two 
Cultures, One University:  The Institutional Origins of the “Two Cultures” Controversy, 34:4 ALBION 606 (2002).   
22 SNOW, supra note 21, at 4.   
23 See F.R. LEAVIS, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF C.P. SNOW (1962).   
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crises mainly focused on university governance:  who should have the power to allocate 
resources within the university?24  In the 1980s and 1990s, resource struggles were joined by 
challenges to the continuing validity of Snow’s dichotomy, most visibly in the “canon wars” 
over the construction of new humanities curricula25 and the “science wars” over the legitimacy of 
the sciences considered from a humanistic perspective.26  In the last decade, the focus of debate 
has shifted back to resource allocation.  As public support for higher education institutions has 
declined, the institutions have had to suspend or terminate departments; most often, the 
downsized departments have been humanities departments.27   
These developments have prompted a great outpouring of critical commentary for a 
general audience.  As Snow and Leavis did decades ago, academics and advocates have justified 
competing claims to resources by differentiating the activities of different groups within the 
academy, in part based on those groups’ own descriptions of their activities, and attempting to 
show which have the best claims to social legitimacy.28  They have also sought to show that the 
university, as a whole, serves social functions distinct from those served by other institutions.29  
Such arguments take different forms when made by or for groups within the academy—like law 
and business schools—that have direct links to professional groups in the non-academic society.   
 
C.  Special Features of the Legal Academy 
Since the late nineteenth century, most American law schools have been situated within 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., Walter P. Metzger, The Crisis of Academic Authority, 99:3 DAEDALUS 568 (1970); DELANTY, supra 
note 20, at 2. 
25 For an overview, see Rachel Donadio, Revisiting the Canon Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/books/review/Donadio-t.html. 
26 Prominent contributions from the Snow point of view were PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER 
SUPERSTITION:  THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE (1994); Alan D. Sokal, Transgressing the 
Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 SOCIAL TEXT 217 (1996) 
(offering scandalous spoof of humanistic critique of scientific work).  
27 See, e.g., Budget-Cutting Colleges Bid Some Languages Adieu, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/education/05languages.html. 
28 See, e.g., JONATHAN R. COLE, THE GREAT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: ITS RISE TO PREEMINENCE, ITS 
INDISPENSABLE NATIONAL ROLE, WHY IT MUST BE PROTECTED (2010); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, NOT FOR PROFIT: 
WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS THE HUMANITIES (2010). 
29 See, e.g., STANLEY ARONOWITZ, THE KNOWLEDGE FACTORY: DISMANTLING THE CORPORATE UNIVERSITY 
AND CREATING TRUE HIGHER LEARNING (2001); DELANTY, supra note 20; LOUIS MENAND, THE MARKETPLACE OF 
IDEAS: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (2010). 
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institutions of higher education, but outside colleges of arts and sciences.30  So it is not surprising 
that debates about the purposes and value of higher education would be echoed in the law school 
context, even where they did not concern the legal academy directly.  But because of the peculiar 
place of law schools in the academy and the society, discussions of the value of legal scholarship 
encounter unique problems.   
American law schools most basically differ from schools of arts and sciences in that most 
of their students attend law schools specifically to be eligible for professional licensing.31  In 
addition, law school faculty have traditionally not been trained as academic professionals, but 
have received the same training as those students who become lawyers (although recent hiring 
trends may be eroding this tradition).32  And unlike other academics, law school faculty are 
expected to publicize their research largely through student-edited journals, rather than the peer-
reviewed journals common in other disciplines.33  As a result, decisions about which scholarship 
will be published, and where, are mostly made not by academics but by students in training to 
become non-academic professionals.34   
Debate concerning this last practice shades easily into, and complicates, debates about the 
purposes of legal scholarship.  If those purposes are understood to be primarily educational and 
instrumental—the education of law students35 and the persuasion of lawmakers and judges36—
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885, 1885 (1992); Linda R. 
Crane, Interdisciplinary Combined-Degree and Graduate Law Degree Programs:  History and Trends, 33 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 47, 53 (1999). 
31 See ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SURVEY OF 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 86-95 (1953). 
32 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 885; John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Professional Objectives in 
Legal Education: American Trends and English Comparisons, 2 PRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE LAW: WHAT ARE LAW 
SCHOOLS FOR? (1996). 
33 See, e.g., Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Legal Scholarship, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 268 (1990); 
Deborah Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (2002); Ronald D. Rotunda, Law Reviews—The 
Extreme Centrist Position, 62 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1986).  For criticism of these practices, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, 
Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 58; Natalie C. Cotton, Comment, The Competence of 
Students as Editors of Law Reviews: A Response to Judge Posner, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 951 (2006).    
34 Some believe that these decisions also determine which pieces will have the most impact.  See, e.g., Merritt & 
Putnam, supra note 2, at 889-90 (finding that scholars are more likely than courts to cite pieces that appeared in 
prestigious journals).  But see Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement: Benefit or Beauty 
Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374, 375 (2006) (arguing that high-quality articles are cited regardless of the review’s 
prestige); Rotunda, supra note 33, at 8 (similar).   
35 See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 33, at 4. 
36 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131 (1981); Edward L. Rubin, 
The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1850 (1988). 
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then it makes sense to continue the tradition of student editing.  If, on the other hand, law 
reviews are conceived as providing the primary outlet for legal academics’ scholarship, and if 
that scholarship is thought of as analogous to the scholarship produced by academics in other 
parts of the university, the use of student editors as gatekeepers may come to seem problematic.37  
Consensus on the functions of law reviews is elusive, in part, because of a more basic 
ambiguity in the law school’s situation at the intersection of two heavily discursive professional 
systems:  that of law and that of the academy.  This positioning is reflected in the other 
institutional characteristics of American law schools and creates confusion about legal 
academics’ role in the shaping of professional and cultural discourses, and about the status and 
purposes of legal scholarship.  Traditional doctrinal scholarship, which largely treats the two 
professional systems involved as one, is characterized by a “unity of discourse” with professional 
legal discourse:  doctrinal scholarship mimics the form, rhetoric, and normative purpose of legal 
advocacy and judicial opinions.38  But legal academics have been producing non-doctrinal 
scholarship, as well, at least since the early twentieth century.39  This type of scholarship, which 
can be called interdisciplinary, is modeled on the scholarship produced by non-legal academics, 
and it is not always clear what makes such scholarship specifically “legal.”  Surveying these 
practices, some have concluded that there really is no such thing as “legal scholarship,” but only 
professional legal discourse, on the one hand, and non-legal scholarship, on the other, each to be 
evaluated by the norms of a different professional system.40   Those who disagree, contending 
that a specifically “legal scholarship” does exist, remain divided about where such scholarship 
fits into the Snow universe—whether it is a humane discipline,41 a social science,42 or something 
else.   
Unless these points are settled, defenses of the value of legal scholarship have little hope 
of succeeding.  Practice alone seems unlikely to settle them.  Not surprisingly, legal academics 
have drawn on a variety of scholarly resources in attempts to address the issue, including the 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1002, 1007 n.17 (1991). 
38 Rubin, supra note 36, at 1859-60. 
39 See, e.g., Max Radin, Scientific Method and Law, 19 Cal. L. Rev. 164 (1931). 
40 This position has been noted by, e.g., Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. 
REV. 1131, 1132 n.4 (1987); Balkin, supra note 13, at 967; Rubin, supra note 36, at 1835. 
41 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 13, at 962. 
42 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 30, at 1900. 
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vocabularies and structures of not just political and legal advocacy43 but also those of Anglo-
American philosophy,44 continental philosophy,45 cultural studies,46 qualitative sociology,47 and 
descriptive economics.48  Oddly, legal academics seem so far not to have consulted the 
considerable body of academic work on the social, institutional, and material features of 
scholarship systems.  This is the focus of Part II.  
 
II.  ACADEMIC INQUIRY AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON 
Scholarly approaches to the study of academic practices have taken three main forms.  
The first approach, a conceptual one, borrows from (and contributes to) philosophical inquiry, 
especially the philosophy of science.  In addition to Snow, this approach is associated with the 
work of Thomas S. Kuhn and those influenced by him.  The other two approaches use methods 
associated with the social sciences:  interpretive studies based on interviews or participant-
observer fieldwork, and studies of the material records of scholarly work, especially their formal 
characteristics, sometimes called “bibliometrics.”49  This Part discusses the relations among 
these three approaches, then considers the oddly limited scope of legal scholarship on textual 
practices in general and scholarly texts in particular. 
 
A.  Social Science Accounts of Academic Inquiry 
1. Conceptual and Participant-Based Approaches 
Most contemporary conceptual approaches to the study of the dynamics of academic  
                                                 
43 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 36, at 1131; Alexander, supra note 30, at 1898, Chemerinsky, supra note 11, 
at 886-93; David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One:  Law 
Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK L. REV. 761, 764 
(2005); Rotunda, supra note 33, at 2. 
44 See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 37. 
45 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 36; Pierre Schlag, The Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).  
46 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 13. 
47 See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers:  Substantive Legal Theory and Its Audiences, 63 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 569 (1992). 
48 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 36; George L. Priest, Triumphs or Failures of Modern Legal Scholarship and 
the Conditions of Its Production, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 725 (1992); George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary 
Research and the Industrial Structure of the Production of Ideas:  A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 MICH. L. REV. 
1929 (1993). 
49 Fred Shapiro defined “bibliometrics” for a law-review audience as “studies which seek to quantify the 
processes of written communication.”  Fred Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1540, 
1541 n.8 (1985) (quoting 12 AM. REV. INFO. SCI. & TECH. 35 (1977)).  See generally NICOLA DE BELLIS, 
BIBLIOMETRICS AND CITATION ANALYSIS:  FROM THE SCIENCE CITATION INDEX TO CYBERMETRICS (2009). 
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inquiry acknowledge the influence of Thomas Kuhn’s 1962 book The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions.  Kuhn questioned traditional understandings of the nature of scientific progress, like 
Snow’s.  Such progress, according to Kuhn, does not involve just the gradual accumulation of 
new information and techniques, building on previous insights, but also occasional “paradigm 
shifts” based on radically new conceptualizations of the world and our interaction with it.  In the 
periods between such shifts, scientists engage in “normal science,” expanding the applications of 
the currently dominant paradigms through “puzzle-solving.”50   
Kuhn’s account has gained wide (though not universal) acceptance as an accurate and 
fruitful way of thinking about intellectual change in general.51  Although many legal academics 
are familiar with Kuhn and his basic ideas,52 they have not made much use of some of the 
elaborations of these ideas by others.  Much Kuhn-influenced work has explored the social 
dimensions of particular paradigm shifts:  the ways in which the reception and dissemination of 
scholarly ideas and their expressions are shaped by social as well as conceptual factors.  The 
“science studies” school examines how specific scientific and technological changes depend on 
improbable convergences of political and economic resources, personal ties, and communication 
systems.53  (This and similar work sparked the “science wars” mentioned earlier.)  Sociologist 
Randall Collins has blended Kuhnian and other frameworks to explain the global development 
and recurrence of schools of philosophical thought as a matter of interpersonal ties and 
institutional settings.54   
In recent decades, social scientists have increasingly studied these details of the social 
setting of academic work, and the relations among different types of academic work, through 
interviews, questionnaires, and participant observation.  A good example is Tony Becher’s 
                                                 
50 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
51 See, e.g., RANDALL COLLINS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: A GLOBAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL 
CHANGE 537 (1998). 
52 See, e.g., Charles W. Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm, 42 DUKE L.J. 840 
(1993); Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science:  Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U. 
PA. L. REV. 933 (1991); Rubin, supra note 13, at 957.   
53 See, e.g., Michel Callon, Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the 
Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay, in POWER, ACTION AND BELIEF: A NEW SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 196 (John Law 
ed., 1986); BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE:  THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC 
FACTS (1979).   
54 COLLINS, supra note 51, at 129. 
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highly regarded 1989 study of “academic tribes and territories.”55  Based on interviews with 220 
academics in the United Kingdom and United States, Becher proposed a taxonomy of 
disciplinary sub-institutions based on their characteristics along two dimensions, the cognitive 
and the social.  Becher suggested that cognitively, disciplines are either predominantly “hard” 
(quantitative and cumulative, with research questions determined by available technologies) or 
“soft” (qualitative and controversial, less determined by technique) and either “pure” (self-
regulating) or “applied” (regulated by outside interests).56  Socially, he described disciplines as 
either “convergent” (maintaining uniform standards and a stable elite) or “divergent” (marked by 
disputation and often valuing the unorthodox) and either “urban” (marked by intense 
communication among a small number of researchers, with quick resolution of mutually 
recognized problems) or “rural” (marked by more dispersed researchers and slower recognition 
and resolution of problems).57  Becher’s study is valuable because it adds detail to Snow’s “two 
cultures” taxonomy, allowing greater specificity about the position of law schools in the 
contemporary academy.  In Becher’s view (supported by Fiona Cownie’s more recent work on 
legal academia in the United Kingdom),58 law as an academic discipline is cognitively unique in 
that it is soft and applied (the only other applied disciplines Becher identifies are pharmacology 
and engineering);59 socially, it is divergent60 and rural.61  Interestingly, considered under 
Becher’s scheme, law as a profession would seem to bear different characteristics; indeed, as a 
profession, Western law might be considered the paradigmatic “convergent” discourse.62    
One limitation of Becher’s work is that it presents a snapshot of academic “tribes” at a 
moment in time and does not try to explain why a variety of disciplinary cultures might 
originally have developed.  Others have tried to do so.  Sociologist Andrew Abbott, for example, 
has argued that the social and cultural conditions present in the late nineteenth-century United 
                                                 
55 TONY BECHER, ACADEMIC TRIBES AND TERRITORIES:  INTELLECTUAL ENQUIRY AND THE CULTURES OF 
DISCIPLINES (1989). 
56 Id. at 152-71. 
57 Id. 
58 FIONA COWNIE, LEGAL ACADEMICS:  CULTURE AND IDENTITIES (2004).   
59 BECHER, supra note 55, at 155. 
60 Id. at 156.    
61 Id. at 158. 
62 Cf. DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW (1963); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
LAW:  LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007). 
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States generated the constellation of arts and sciences disciplines that still structure the American 
university—and that concerns about overspecialization and the need for interdisciplinary 
conversations are just as old as this arrangement.63  (Abbott does not analyze law schools, but it 
would appear that the same is true of them.)  Abbott attributes this stability to academic hiring 
practices and more basic social psychological dynamics.  But according to him, this institutional 
stability breeds conceptual dynamism:  within each discipline, and among them, other pressures, 
including the logical consequences of the division of labor in any sphere, the drive to seek status, 
and competition for resources, impel an “endlessly proliferating lineage structure” of academic 
subspecialties, which Abbott describes as “fractal” in shape.64  Drawing on his own prior work 
on the sociology of professions, Abbott notes that “differentiation[] along the lines of ‘purity’ is 
quite general to knowledge-based occupations,” like academia; “specialists . . . tend to withdraw 
into pure work,” particularly when their authority or expertise is challenged by others.65  This 
tendency is true of both academic professionals and other professionals, including lawyers.66   
 
2. Network and Bibliometric Approaches 
According to Abbott, academics are under constant pressure to “find[] new areas of 
things to know,” and they do so by “rearrang[ing their] fractal allegiances,” redefining and 
recombining conceptual and rhetorical distinctions previously drawn within and between 
disciplines to justify the continuing division of academic labor.67  A good example of this kind of 
bridge building in the academy is the study of network properties, which draws upon a variety of 
traditional fields of inquiry and has “exploded across the academic spectrum” over the past 
several decades.68  Early on, those studying networks turned their attention to networks of 
communications, including the networks formed by citation references in academic publications.  
The study of large networks of this kind was assisted by the creation, in the 1960s, of machine-
                                                 
63 ANDREW ABBOTT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES 122 n.1, 122-26, 136 (2001).   
64 Id. at 130, 147-52. 
65 Id. at 22; see also id. at 146-47. 
66 See ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS:  AN ESSAY IN THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 8-9 
(1988). 
67 Id. at 230-31.   
68 Duncan J. Watts, The “New” Science of Networks, 30 ANNUAL REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 243, 243 (2004).  On the 
development of the field, see LINTON C. FREEMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A STUDY 
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE (2004). 
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searchable periodicals indexing databases modeled on the Shepard’s citation system familiar to 
lawyers since the late nineteenth century.69  But despite the filial relation between legal text 
practices and this area of academic research, many legal academics are unfamiliar with some of 
the central developments in the field.   
A pivotal figure in the study of academic citation networks was the physicist and 
information scientist Derek de Solla Price.70  In 1965 Price published an analysis of several 
“citation summaries” of publications in scientific journals, assessing patterns in the frequency 
with which the publications cited earlier publications in the population.71  One of his enduring 
findings was that citation practices follow power laws, that is, a very small number of papers 
receive the vast majority of citations from later papers.72  Considering the shifts in the identity of 
heavily cited papers over time, Price coined the term “research front” to describe their 
significance and suggested that “it is the existence of a research front, in this sense, that 
distinguishes the sciences from the rest of scholarship.”73  As this language indicates, Price was 
writing within a paradigm inspired by Snow’s dichotomy and vision of science as cumulative.74 
Other scholars, discussed below, have developed Price’s speculations about the 
possibility of differentiating among disciplines based on the patterns of citation in their 
literatures.  In his own later work, Price focused mainly on identifying additional general 
principles.  One was the phenomenon of “cumulative advantage processes,” or the principle “that 
success seems to breed success,” which, Price contended, applies across scholarly areas.75  In this 
work, Price showed that citation frequencies are determined not by the contents of cited works so 
much as “the past history of the cited paper; . . . citations are generated by a pull mechanism 
                                                 
69 See Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1540-42. 
70 On the impact of Price’s work, see M.E.J. Newman, The Structure and Function of Complex Networks, 45 
SIAM REV. 167, 176, 186-88, 213-15, 220 (2003).   
71 Derek J. de Solla Price, Networks of Scientific Papers, 149 SCI. 510, 510 (1965).   
72 Id. at 511.  For an explanation of power-law distributions and scale-free networks, see Watts, supra note 68, 
at 250-51.  On the ubiquity of naturally occurring power-law distributions and scale-free networks, see also David 
G. Post & Michael B. Eisen, How Long Is the Coastline of the Law?  Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal 
Systems, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 569-70 & n.37 (2000).   
73 Price, supra note 71, at 512. 
74 See id. at 515.   
75 Derek J. de Solla Price, A General Theory of Bibliometric and Other Cumulative Advantage Processes, 27 J. 
AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. 292 (1976). 
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from previous citation rather than from a push mechanism of the papers that do the citing.”76  
Citation frequency counts reflect the circumstances surrounding the generation and especially the 
past scholarly treatment of particular scholarly efforts.77  This does not mean frequency counts 
are meaningless; they might not measure merit, but they are “a rough measure of the writings 
which have had the most extensive impact.”78  Thus, this principle supports, at the level of 
concrete textual features, the Kuhn-derived analysis of the social determinants of intellectual 
change.  The cumulative advantage principle, together with the power-law distribution of 
citations, also led Price to develop the notion of “invisible colleges,”79 defined as “the 
hierarchical elite resulting from an expectable inequality” produced by these two principles.80  
Elites of this kind exhibit “total undemocracy,” according to Price, but are not caused by 
deliberate domination; “the phenomenon is . . . a mechanism thrown up automatically by the 
scientific community.”81   
Others have pursued the implications of Price’s hints at a taxonomy of disciplinary 
citation practices.  One of the most comprehensive such studies, by Lowell Hargens, compared 
scholarly citation networks in seven research areas to test Price’s hypothesis that disciplinary 
reference patterns tend to fall into two forms:82  a research-front model, which “focus[es] on 
recently published research while tending to ignore foundational work”83 and corresponds to 
Kuhn’s normal science and Becher’s hard and convergent disciplines, and a model of work that 
                                                 
76 Id. at 304-05. 
77 For a parallel account of legal citation practices that does not cite Price or use similar methods, see J.M. 
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 845 (1996) 
(describing “citation practices a[s] a sort of economy of communication and exchange between academics, or . . . an 
ecology of reproduction and hence competition with other citations”). 
78 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100 YALE L.J. 1449, 1543-54 (1991) 
[hereinafter Shapiro, Yale]. 
79 See DEREK J. DE SOLLA PRICE, LITTLE SCIENCE, BIG SCIENCE (1963); Derek J. de Solla Price, Some Remarks 
on Elitism in Information and the Invisible College Phenomenon in Science, 22 J. Am. Soc’y for Info. Sci. 74 (1971) 
[hereinafter Price, Remarks].  See also DIANA CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES:  DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN 
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES (1972). 
80 Price, Remarks, supra note 79, at 75.   
81 Id.  
82 Lowell L. Hargens, Using the Literature:  Reference Networks, Reference Contexts, and the Social Structure 
of Scholarship, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 846, 849 & n.7 (2000).  The seven fields were celestial masers, an astronomy 
research area; chiral separations, a chemistry research area; light-front physics, a theoretical nuclear physics research 
area; literary criticism on the works of Toni Morrison, an American literature research area; organizational 
population ecology, a sociology research area; rational expectations, an economics research area, and the Stroop 
effect, a psychology research area.  Id. at 850 & Table I. 
83 Id. at 846. 
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tends to “pursue questions raised in classic texts or exegesis”84 of those texts, associated with 
Becher’s soft and divergent disciplines.85  Hargens’s study, echoing Becher’s qualitative 
approach to the relations among disciplines, suggested that Price’s dichotomy was too basic.  
While papers on natural science subjects do cite recently published work more often than papers 
on humanities and behavioral science subjects do,86 Hargens found that behavioral science 
papers (especially on rational expectations theory), not humanities papers, most overcited 
foundational papers.87  Hargens was not certain of the explanation for these patterns, but he did 
note that they might result from the different social characteristics of different fields:  in 
convergent or urban fields, the need to cite foundational works should decrease for the duration 
of consensus, since authors will not need to convince readers of the significance of their 
contributions.88  This explanation was consistent with Hargens’s finding that scholars in different 
areas used citations differently within their work.  In fields in which authors overcited 
foundational papers, they also used more “orienting research lists” (similar to what lawyers know 
as string cites) to “provide a framework for their work and imply that the framework constitutes 
an acknowledged scholarly position,” as well as “a legitimate approach.”89   
Although the focus of this study is on citation patterns, not all systematic analysis of the 
material records of scholarly work has focused on citation networks.  Academics have also 
analyzed patterns in the content of scholarly publications and have found disciplinary differences 
in this dimension as well.90  Work of both kinds validates some intuitions and conclusions 
reached by other methods, but it also supplies detail unavailable to other models of research and 
                                                 
84 Id.  
85 Earlier, Charles Bazerman proposed that scholars working in more contested fields, such as political science, 
would overcite foundational sources; lacking “a theory that could provide a ‘consistent rhetoric’ for their research, 
authors [would be] forced to construct justifications that ‘reassemble, reinterpret, and discuss anew wide ranges of 
the literature, dating back into the discipline’s history.’”  Hargens, supra note 82, at 857 (quoting CHARLES 
BAZERMAN, SHAPING WRITTEN KNOWLEDGE:  THE GENRE AND ACTIVITY OF THE EXPERIMENTAL ARTICLE IN 
SCIENCE 283 (1988)).   
86 Hargens, supra note 82, at 850-54. 
87 Id. at 854.   
88 Id. at 856.  
89 Id. at 858.  The fields exhibiting both increased use of “orienting research lists” and overcitation of 
foundational papers were the three behavioral science areas Hargens studied (organizational population ecology, 
rational expectations, and the Stroop effect).  In the humanities area, both citations to foundational papers and 
orienting research lists were absent.   
90 See especially SUSAN PECK MACDONALD, PROFESSIONAL ACADEMIC WRITING IN THE HUMANITIES AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCES (1994). 
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can produce surprising information.  Although the questions this kind of work can answer are 
limited in scope, they are not limited by research area; there is no reason to think similar 
approaches might not be fruitfully applied to legal scholarship.   
 
B.  The Analysis of Text Networks in Legal Scholarship 
Given legal academics’ long traditions of self-scrutiny and self-defense, as well as their 
longstanding tendency to borrow from other disciplines, it is surprising that no legal academics 
have drawn on studies of textual practices to clarify their tasks and distinguish their work from 
that of other academics, on the one hand, and lawyers, on the other.  Legal academics have 
indeed recognized the pertinence of citation analysis to their field (and even to their 
understanding of their own work), but they have neglected the kind of work done by scholars 
like Price and Hargens.91  This Part explores the limitations of the ways legal academics have 
considered their own textual practices.  
First-year law students quickly learn that text networks, as embodied in citations, are 
crucial to the legal system.  As Fred Shapiro has noted, “[l]inks between documents . . . are more 
important in law than in any other discipline. . . .  In judges’ opinions . . ., citation links . . . are 
more significant than the words that surround the citations.”92  It is natural, then, that citation 
practices within legal texts, especially judicial opinions, would have become a subject of interest 
to legal scholars.  They have studied patterns of judicial citation of prior judicial precedent93 and 
patterns of judicial citation of other sources, including scholarly materials.94  Anxieties about the 
value and purposes of legal scholarship have led to comparisons, already mentioned, of the ways 
                                                 
91 For example, in the first of his series of articles on the most-cited law review articles, Fred Shapiro mentioned 
several leaders of the field, including Eugene Garfield, Kenneth Clark, and Jonathan and Stephen Cole, but not 
Price.  Shapiro, supra note 49, at 1541-43. 
92 Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 751, 752 (1996) 
[hereinafter Shapiro, Revisited]. 
93 See, e.g., William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence:  A Citation 
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998). 
94 See, e.g., Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and Journals, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 400 
(1986); Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2; Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by 
Courts:  An Empirical Study, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1998); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies, The Citing of 
Law Reviews by the Supreme Court:  An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131 (1986); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., & Beth 
A. Drew, The Citing of Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals:  An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 1051 (1991). 
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that judicial opinions and other legal scholarship cite law review articles.95  In both areas, 
citation patterns follow the power law identified by Price96 and seem unrelated to the quality of 
the cited materials, however that quality might be evaluated, echoing his “cumulative advantage” 
principle.97  In at least some areas, too, legal academics have observed the formation of 
“invisible colleges,” although, again, they do not follow Price’s account of the phenomenon.98   
Legal scholars have explicitly recognized that citation analysis offers “grist” for “a 
sociology of legal scholarship.”99  But although they seem eager to study networks of legal texts, 
they have produced few detailed studies of text networks within legal scholarship itself.100  There 
is a tinge of embarrassment to legal academics’ work on scholarly citation practices, which has 
mostly been limited to examining and comparing the numbers of citations individual articles 
receive.101  In fact, the most sophisticated studies of textual practices in legal scholarship to date 
have been produced not by legal academics but by scholars in other fields:  journalism, 
communications, and rhetoric.   
The only study of legal scholarship to draw on Price’s work in particular compared 
citation patterns in law review articles addressing media law with patterns in work on the same 
topic published in media and communications studies journals.102  The authors found that “law 
review citations [tend to be to more] recent materials, while citations in mass communication 
                                                 
95 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Frederick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 427 (2000); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Heavily Cited Articles in Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 825 (1996); Mann, supra note 94; Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2; Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity:  Some 
Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 38 n.150 (1992); Shapiro, supra note 49; Shapiro, Yale, supra 
note 78; Shapiro, Revisited, supra note 92. 
96 See, e.g., Sirico & Drew, supra note 94, at 1058-60 (showing predominance of citations to three law reviews 
and to recent articles in circuit court memorandum opinions); Merritt & Putnam, supra note 2, at 888, 899-908. 
97 See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 77, at 846; Alfred L. Brophy, The Signaling Value of Law Reviews:  
An Exploration of Citations and Prestige, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 229, 238 (2009); Ronen Perry, The Relative Value 
of American Law Reviews: Refinement and Implementation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3, 4, 34 (2006). 
98 See especially Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:  Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 
132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 563, 566 (1981) (concluding, based on “informal sociogram,” i.e., social-network diagram, 
of citations in high-profile scholarship on civil rights, that “mainstream writers [in this area] tend to acknowledge 
only each other’s work”). 
99 Shapiro, Yale, supra note 78, at 1457. 
100 See, e.g., Ayres & Vars, supra note 95, at 427-28.   
101 Id. at 447 (“Citations analysis . . . unavoidably has a gossipy and at times tawdry aspect.  We are drawn to 
citation rankings . . . but we are simultaneously repulsed by them . . . .”).  See also Brophy, supra note 97, at 232; 
Rubin, supra note 13, at 936.     
102 See Yorgo Pasadeos, Matthew D. Bunker, & Kyun Soo Kim, Influences on the Media Law Literature:  A 
Divergence of Mass Communication Scholars and Legal Scholars?, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 179 (2006). 
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journals are to much older publications” and that “mass communication scholars cite their law 
school colleagues often, but citations in the opposite direction are much less frequent.”103  They 
hypothesized that legal scholarship might more generally tend to be more cumulative—akin to 
the scientific work produced during periods of normal science—than communications 
scholarship,104 or, alternatively, that “mass communication media law scholars are engaged in a 
somewhat more theoretically grounded enterprise that focuses more on the big questions in 
media law jurisprudence.”105  A more recent study of textual practices in law review writing 
reached some similar conclusions.106  This analysis of grammatical and rhetorical features of law 
review pieces on a particular topic (the arbitrability of claims by nonparties to arbitration 
agreements) found that the pieces seemed to resemble behavioral science scholarship—
especially “literature reviews”—more than humanities scholarship.107 
No legal academic seems to have made comparable use of the analysis of textual 
practices in legal academic work.108  This might be just happenstance—maybe no legal academic 
has been well positioned to make this integration.  Or it might be a matter of the difficulties of 
identifying boundaries between research areas in law; many of the most interesting analyses of 
the material records of academic work take a comparative approach, but such an approach 
requires consensus on the units to be compared.  Departmental divisions in universities provide a 
natural focal point, but American law schools lack any analogous internal institutional feature.109  
It cannot be, however, that legal academics have neglected these approaches because they are 
irrelevant to legal academics’ concerns.  Legal academics’ work is at least as much constituted 
by citation networks as that generated by other academics.  And plenty of legal academics have 
speculated about the social and institutional determinants of legal scholarship; they have just 
                                                 
103 Id. at 179. 
104 Id. at 194. 
105 Id. at 195-96. 
106 See Douglas M. Coulson, Legal Writing and Disciplinary Knowledge-Building:  A Comparative Study, 6 J. 
ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 160 (2009). 
107 Id. at 191-92. 
108 Edward Rubin has opined that “legal articles . . . . do not display that higher degree of internal structure that 
characterizes many other academic fields, and that would be recognized as a cumulative tradition,” Rubin, supra 
note 36, at 1885, but he does not seem to have based this conclusion on systematic study of the features of legal 
scholarship. 
109 For example, the Ayres-Vars study relied on the subject-matter categories of the Wilson Index to Legal 
Periodicals, but these categories do not map onto those used by Merritt and Putnam or by Crespi to determine that 
articles on statutory interpretation were among the most cited.  Ayres & Vars, supra note 95, at 432 n.21, 438, 448. 
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tended to draw on different disciplines to do so, and to focus on the scholarship’s content, 
themes, and format, instead of its other textual features.110  The neglect of these approaches in 
legal self-scrutiny probably has more to do with the fact that they have been developed in 
relatively low-status academic specialties.  Legal scholars tend to borrow from other disciplines 
to enhance the claim of their own work to serious scholarly status, and the current disciplinary 
status hierarchy privileges the pure, hard disciplines over others.111  While bibliometrics and 
citation analysis are cognitively hard, they are also associated with issues that have a decidedly 
“applied” status within law schools—the details and mechanics of academic and professional 
textual practices.   
Somewhat inconsistently, legal academics are quite interested in the textual practices of 
judges and other nonacademic powerholders and seem to accord relatively high status to the 
detailed analysis of these practices.112  In this area, legal academics have long recognized—and 
capitalized on—the functional overlap between academic professionalism and legal 
professionalism, both of them areas in which the principal forms of expertise concern the 
processing and generation of texts.  This overlap may partly explain why legal scholarship in this 
area seems relatively immune to anxieties about the value and purposes of legal scholarship.  
Academics in any discipline have expertise in the analysis and generation of texts, so their 
statements on that subject appear inherently valuable.113  And because so much of what lawyers 
and judges do involves texts, scholarship addressing such practices would seem to be an easy 
“sell” to those who have to try to solve textual puzzles—justifying their solutions by reference to 
other texts—on the ground.114  If legal scholarship on the subject of interpretation has a special 
status, then, it may be as much a product of blindness to and elision of the conditions of that 
scholarship’s production as of a convergence of interests and objectives.  The next two Parts of 
                                                 
110 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
111 See COWNIE, supra note 58, at 64; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
112 See sources cited supra notes 92-99. 
113 See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 36, at 1846.  
114 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, What Does Prescriptive Legal Scholarship Say and Who Is Listening to It?  A 
Response to Professor Dan-Cohen, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 731, 742 (1992) (“The proper role of legal scholars is to 
speak to the communicative elements in judges’ overall behavior.  When the judge is trying to interpret a text . . ., 
the prescriptions of legal scholars become relevant and useful.  They are relevant because prescriptions about proper 
interpretation of a legal text or proper explanations of judicial reasoning are within the specific competency of 
scholars.”). 
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this article explore the expressions and implications of these possibilities in scholarship on legal 
interpretation published in American law reviews since the 1890s.     
 
III.  THE PATHS OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP 
This Part and the next are based on a study of the 154 most-cited articles on general 
topics in legal interpretation published in American law reviews between the late nineteenth 
century and the present.115  This Part considers the content and themes of some of this work; the 
next considers the citation network generated by the articles. 
 
A.  Progenitors:  Thayer and Holmes 
The two earliest pieces in the group are James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 article The Origin 
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law116 and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
1899 essay The Theory of Legal Interpretation.117  Together, these pieces established a lasting 
framework for scholarship on legal interpretation.  Thayer’s article addresses a narrow question 
but identified a number of issues that still await resolution; Holmes’s addresses a broader topic 
but offered no specific prescription.  Although neither piece had the direct impact on legal 
doctrine of the Brandeis-Warren or Charles Warren articles, both have been cited an unusually 
large number of times in judicial decisions as well as subsequent scholarship.  The relative 
popularity of the pieces in these two arenas, however, suggests an unexpected configuration of 
interests.   
The “doctrine of constitutional law” mentioned in Thayer’s title is the practice of judicial 
review of the constitutionality of legislative enactments.118  Thayer’s article is best known for its 
                                                 
115 See Appendix A.  The articles in the list include studies of interpretive practice and authority, as well as 
analyses of the role of interpretation in legal reasoning and defenses or critiques of particular interpretive methods.  
They also include articles focusing on specific categories of legal texts (such as contracts, constitutions, and 
statutes), specific interpreters, and specific interpretive principles.  But they do not include articles focusing on the 
meaning of specific legal texts or on specific doctrinal areas, such as the interpretation of environmental statutes.  
The list was compiled from a list of the articles published in American law reviews, indexed in Hein Online, 
containing the word “interpretation,” cited more than 100 times (by Hein Online’s count), and fitting the criteria just 
described.  Hein Online was used because of the historical coverage of its law review database.   
116 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV. 129 (1893). 
117 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899). 
118 As Thayer put it, this doctrine “allows to the judiciary the power to declare legislative Acts unconstitutional, 
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articulation of a standard of near-total judicial deference to the constitutionality of legislative 
action.  Thayer argues that any power that courts might have to review the constitutionality of 
legislation has important limitations, which Thayer infers from the implied powers granted to the 
legislature to “interpret” the Constitution in the process of its enactment of laws:   
it is the legislature to whom this power is given,—this power, not merely of 
enacting laws, but of putting an interpretation on the constitution which shall 
deeply affect the whole country, enter into, vitally change, even revolutionize the 
most serious affairs. . . .  It is plain that where a power so momentous as this 
primary power to interpret is given, the actual determinations of the body to 
whom it is intrusted are entitled to a corresponding respect. . . . 119       
Thayer’s characterization of the legislature’s “power to interpret” as awesome and potentially 
threatening contrasts with what he describes as the “pedantic and academic” nature of workaday 
legal interpretation by judges: 
The court’s duty, we are told [by those defending a plenary power of judicial 
review], is the mere and simple office of construing two writings and comparing 
one with another, as two contracts or two statutes are construed and compared 
when they are said to conflict; of declaring the true meaning of each . . . an 
ordinary and humble judicial duty, as the courts sometimes describe it. . . .  
[Judicial review so conceived involves] a pedantic and academic treatment of the 
texts of the constitution and the laws.120 
This basic distinction between legislative interpretation of the constitution and judicial 
interpretation of other legal texts is the core of Thayer’s argument for judicial restraint.121  
Ordinary legal interpretation involves an effort to “ascertain or apply [the] true meaning” of a 
text, an area in which judges have expertise, if of a “humble” sort.  Judicial review, in contrast, 
concerns “whether legislation is sustainable or not,” not the “true meaning of the constitution.”122  
According to Thayer, judges have the capacity—perhaps—to make the former kind of judgment, 
but not the latter, partly because no such “true meaning” really exists:  “the constitution often 
admits of different interpretations; . . . . the constitution does not impose on the legislature any 
                                                                                                                                                             
and to treat them as null.”  Thayer, supra note 116, at 129.   
119 Id. at 136.   
120 Id. at 138.     
121 Id. at 143-44 (“If [the courts’] duty were in truth merely and nakedly to ascertain the meaning of the text of 
the constitution and of the impeached Act of the legislature, and to determine, as an academic question, whether in 
the court’s judgment the two were in conflict, it would . . . be an elevated and important office . . . but yet a function 
far simpler than it actually is.”); see also id. at 139, 141, 150, 151. 
122 Id. at 150.   
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one specific opinion, but leaves open [a] range of choice.”123  By distinguishing judicial from 
legislative interpretive expertise in this way, Thayer avoided addressing the question that has 
vexed many subsequent lawyers and judges, including Holmes:  to what extent do all legal texts 
“admit[] of different interpretations”?  Later writers have also continued to wrestle with 
questions directly raised by Thayer, such as the scope of legislative supremacy, as well as with 
themes implicit in his argument, especially his ambivalent characterization of interpretation as 
simultaneously awesome and petty.124      
In the seven years between the publication of Thayer’s article and Holmes’s, the Supreme 
Court cited a law review article for the first time in an opinion.125  And at the time Holmes’ short 
piece appeared, he had been serving on the bench of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts for seventeen years.  Despite Holmes’s presumably practical perspective, his chief 
topic in this piece was highly abstract:  the determinacy of meaning of words in legal documents.  
Holmes distinguished between meaning in theory and meaning in practice in a way that recalls 
Thayer’s distinction between judicial and legislative interpretation:  “It is true that in theory any 
document purporting to . . . have some legal effect has one meaning and no other . . . .  It is not 
true that in practice . . . a given word or even a given collocation of words has one meaning and 
no other.”126  But Holmes had more to say about the nature of interpretation than Thayer had; 
Holmes described the process as based on the interpreter’s understanding of “the general usages 
of speech” and as a matter of surrendering to “whatever galvanic current may come from the rest 
of the instrument.”127  Holmes’s focus on meaning in practice as a function of usage is the core 
of his objective theory of meaning, the point for which this article is best known.  An important 
implication of the theory is that interpretation requires no special expertise beyond familiarity 
with linguistic usage.  Thus, Holmes presented the theory as applicable to the interpretation of all 
kinds of legal documents; while “[d]ifferent rules might conceivably be laid down for the 
construction of different kinds of writing,” “in fact we do not deal differently with a statute from 
                                                 
123 Id. at 144; see also id. at 150 (“[A] court cannot always, and for the purpose of all sorts of questions, say that 
there is but one right and permissible way of interpreting the constitution.”).   
124 Id. at 156 n.1 (citing 1 Bryce, Am. Com., 1st ed., 377).   
125 See McClintock, supra note 94, at 666 (discussing earliest Supreme Court citation of law review article in 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897) (citing Amasa M. Eaton, On Contracts and 
Restraint of Trade, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128, 129 (1890))).   
126 Holmes, supra note 117, at 417. 
127 Id.  
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our way of dealing with a contract.”128  This conception of interpretation, however, presented a 
paradox:  if interpretation was the simple yet ineffable phenomenon Holmes claimed it was, did 
it need to be (or could it be) theorized at all?  Holmes concluded his piece by suggesting that it 
did, but his explanation was less than detailed:  
It may be, after all, that the matter is one in which the important thing, the law, is 
settled, and different people will account for it by such theory as pleases them 
best. . . .  But although practical men generally prefer to leave their major 
premises inarticulate, yet even for practical purposes theory generally turns out 
the most important thing in the end.  I am far from saying that it might not make a 
difference in the old question to which I have referred.129 
Holmes’s quandary anticipates contemporary anxieties about the purposes and value of legal 
scholarship.130  Should it present the arguments that judges would make, if they only had time,131 
or should it do something else—and if so, what?  Holmes’s consideration of, and inability to 
answer, this question, along with his highly abstract theme, affected later use of his piece by 
legal academics and professionals.   
 While Thayer assumed that diverse constitutional meanings were possible, his main point 
was that judicial practices must be restrained; the Constitution tells us that it is the legislature 
that is the expert on which of its acts are consistent with the document’s commands.  Holmes’s 
point was the reverse:  because meaning is stabilized by usage, all judges have interpretive 
expertise, as lawyers do too, and we do not need to worry too much about checking judicial 
statements about the meaning of texts.  This is the most fundamental contrast between the two 
pieces, and it marks out a polarity that still structures discussion.  Yet even though Thayer 
seemed to offer a more explicit formula for judicial decision making, Holmes’s article has been 
cited in nearly three times as many judicial opinions as Thayer’s.132  Courts cite Holmes 
primarily to support assertions about the plain meaning of legal text.  The popularity of the 
pieces among academics is the reverse.133  This suggests that commentators are more interested 
                                                 
128 Id. at 419.  Holmes also maintained that the same principles applied to the interpretation of wills.  Id.  
129 Id. at 420. 
130 See supra note 6. 
131 See, e.g., Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 43, at 778-79. 
132 Holmes’s piece has been cited 62 times in judicial opinions, Thayer’s 23 times.  Search run on “thayer /s 
scope /s 129” and “holmes /s theory /s 417” in Westlaw ALLCASES database on Dec. 14, 2010. 
133 Thayer’s article has been cited 746 times in commentary since its publication; Holmes’s has been cited only 
306 times.   
18-Feb-11] LEGAL INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP 25 
 
than courts in formulas conducive to limiting the scope of judicial authority, and less interested 
in confirming their own self-conscious reflections on what it is they are doing.  Since legal 
academics are engaged in a normative, interpretive activity that is superficially similar to judges’ 
activities, these academics have an interest in describing judicial power as limited and asserting 
their own competence to do so:  they are competing with courts for expertise-based authority in 
this area.  
 
B.  The Withering of Interest in Contract Interpretation 
Both Thayer and Holmes discussed contract interpretation and statutory interpretation as 
essentially equivalent practices, as seems to have been common at the time.134  But over the 
century since they wrote—particularly since the 1980s—this presupposition has become less 
common.  Broad-spectrum scholarly interest in the interpretation of contracts (as opposed to 
other framings of the treatment of contracts, e.g., their design and the design of rules for their 
enforcement) has declined.  This trend is probably regrettable.   
Only six of the articles in the group assembled for this study address primarily contract 
interpretation (in contrast, 45 address constitutional interpretation, and 69 address statutory 
interpretation).  Only three of these six were published after 1990, and the title of only one of 
those three makes it evident that the article does address contract interpretation.135  It is not 
apparent from this that contracts scholars are writing less about interpretation.  The study shows 
only that scholarly work on contract interpretation receives fewer citations, and apparently less 
attention, across the scholarly spectrum than work on other types of legal interpretation does.  
This could be because scholars interested in public law do not tend to consult contracts 
scholarship, and not because contracts scholars do not find contract interpretation worth 
investigating.136  However, the content of the pieces on contract interpretation that did qualify for 
inclusion in the study does suggest that contracts scholars’ interest has shifted away from issues 
                                                 
134 The same presupposition appears half a century later in Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REV. 407 (1950), which is in the group of articles assembled for this study.  
135 Compare David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991), with Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1990); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits 
of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).   
136 Cf., e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009) (“Issues of contract 
interpretation . . . . probably are the most frequently litigated issues on the civil side of the judicial docket.”). 
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of verbal meaning and toward issues of institutional design and information management, often 
conceived as involving forms of expertise more akin to technical skill than to interpretive or 
linguistic competence.137   
The ebbing of interest in issues of contract interpretation among scholars interested in 
legal interpretation more generally seems unfortunate.  The issues addressed by contracts 
theorists do have important parallels in other areas of law.138  We might understand the 
redirection of contract scholars’ attention from issues of verbal meaning to issues of institutional 
design and information management as reflecting a practical recognition that academics are 
unlikely to settle abstract issues of meaning, especially the nature of meaning, while they might 
be able to reach some consensus on acceptable instruments for the management of meaning.  If 
this is true, public law scholars’ refusal to follow suit may reinforce the likelihood that they will 
continue to debate fundamental issues without reaching agreement. 
 
C.  The Chevron Phenomenon 
Thayer and Holmes of course did not anticipate every feature of later legal interpretation 
scholarship.  When they wrote, for example, administrative agencies were far less numerous and 
powerful than they are today, so it is not surprising that neither of them addressed how agency 
officials might interpret legal texts, or how such interpretations should be treated by courts 
(although they have both been cited in work addressing these issues).  The earliest article on that 
topic in the group assembled for this study is Henry Monaghan’s 1983 article Marbury and the 
Administrative State.139  Monaghan’s approach to the issue, framed as a rebuttal of Thayer, 
anticipated the approach used by the Supreme Court in its Chevron decision the next year140 as 
well as in later academic work on the topic.  Since the mid-1980s, the amount of academic work 
                                                 
137 One of the main points of David Charny’s 1991 article on “the normative structure of contract interpretation” 
is that issues of institutional design and information management have more to do with the interpretation of 
contracts than scholars are prone to think.  Charny, supra note 135. 
138 See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES:  HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 
(2008); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. 
REV. 223 (1986).   
139 Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).   
140 Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  The Chevron opinion did not cite Monaghan’s article. 
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on this topic has dramatically increased,141 and Chevron-focused pieces seem to accrue citations 
more rapidly than articles on other legal interpretation topics.142  But Monaghan’s article was not 
simply a well-timed anticipation of issues that would shortly become significant as a result of 
real-world legal developments.  The flood of scholarship on the topic seems due to other 
institutional developments as well, including developments specific to the academy.  
As noted, Monaghan presented his investigation of the nature and scope of judicial power 
to review administrative agency decisions as, in part, a response to Thayer’s deference thesis.143  
Monaghan rejected Thayer’s “effort to divorce meaning from validity”144 and argued that the 
decision in Marbury v. Madison145 demonstrated the inaccuracy of Thayer’s distinction between 
legal interpretation and judicial review.  In Marbury and since, Monaghan contended, the judicial 
role in passing on the constitutionality of legislation has indeed been understood as a matter of 
interpretation, and in this, it is just like judicial review of administrative action.146  Monaghan 
agreed with Thayer, however, that judges do not have a monopoly on interpretive authority, but 
“share[]” “responsibility for meaning” with agencies:  “the judicial role is to specify what the 
statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all that it does mean.”147 
The next year, the Supreme Court approved the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act to permit the expansion of existing industrial installations 
without pollution-reducing upgrades.148  Chevron is best known not for its facts but for its 
articulation of a standard for judicial review of agency action.  The standard involved a 
Monaghan-style conception of the expertise involved in judicial and agency activities as, above 
all, text-focused and interpretive:  Chevron instructed courts, in reviewing agency action, first to 
interpret the legislation at issue to determine whether Congress had “spoken directly to the 
                                                 
141 Of the 109 articles in Appendix A published since 1983, 55 concern statutory interpretation, and 17 concern 
agency interpretation in particular.     
142 The article with the third-highest weighted citation count among articles on statutory interpretation in the 
study concerns Chevron, as does the most recent article on the list.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001) (third-highest weighted citation count among articles addressing 
statutory interpretation); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006) (most recent). 
143 See Monaghan, supra note 139, at 7-11. 
144 Id. at 14; see also id. at 8, 13 n.75.   
145 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
146 Monaghan, supra note 139, at 6 (“[J]udicial review in both constitutional and administrative law involves 
textual interpretation by the courts.”) (emphasis in original).     
147 Id. at 27.   
148 Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).       
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precise question” and, if it had not, to defer to the agency’s “permissible construction” of the 
statute.149   
Despite Chevron’s now-canonical status, commentators did not immediately herald it as 
dominating the doctrine in this area.  The first article on the subject following Monaghan’s in the 
group assembled for this study postdated Chevron but cited the case only once.150  Not until 1989 
did commentators begin describing Chevron, initially with reservations, as a sea change.151  The 
belated recognition of Chevron as a watershed by commentators was not just a reaction152 to the 
decision but also an effect of an explosion of scholarship concerning the case’s significance and 
implementation.  The flowering of scholarship on this topic coincided with a more general 
flowering of high-profile work on legal interpretation, especially statutory interpretation, in the 
1980s.153  The group of works assembled for this study is dominated by more recent articles, and 
especially by articles published between 1983 and 1992.154  The period was marked not just by 
increased output but also by increased use of other disciplinary resources.  These trends were 
themselves the focus of several articles in the group assembled for this study.155   
This context of the flowering of Chevron scholarship itself occurred within an even 
broader context:  the contemporary exacerbation of a perceived divide between the academy and 
the culture at large that destabilized traditional conceptions of the purposes of academic work 
                                                 
149 Id. at 842-43.   
150 Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 596 n.250 
(1985). 
151 Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 452, 456 (1989); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 512 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 445 
(1989). 
152 See Rubin, supra note 36, at 1883-85 (arguing that all legal scholarship is necessarily “reactive”). 
153 See Rubin, supra note 13, at 932-33; Jean Stefancic, The Law Review Symposium Issue:  Community of 
Meaning or Re-Inscription of Hierarchy?, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 657 (1992). 
154 The earliest year covered in Appendix A represented by more than four articles is 1982.  Four articles on the 
list (three of them on constitutional interpretation) were published in 1975; four were published in 1981 (again 
including three on constitutional interpretation).  For the 1982 to 1991 period, the list includes 7 articles from 1983; 
3 from 1984; 7 from 1985; 5 from 1986; 9 from 1987; 7 from 1988; 9 from 1989; 12 from 1990; 6 from 1991; and 
from 1992.  During this period, only one year produced fewer than five articles that eventually received more than 
100 citations. 
155 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986); J.M. 
Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive 
Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989); Peter C. Schanck, Understanding 
Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992). 
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and put added pressure on academics to legitimate that work.156  Andrew Abbott’s work has 
suggested, and shown, that when an academic community experiences this kind of pressure, 
those at the core of the community will emphasize their control over abstract resources that they 
can define themselves—they withdraw into “pure work”157—and will seek new conceptual 
territory to occupy by bridging existing subject areas and by drawing new “fractal” distinctions 
between their own and previous work.158  The work on Chevron from the late 1980s on typifies 
such responses.  After Monaghan and then the Court identified an abstract, theorizable, and 
textual core to the problem of judicial review of agency action, legal scholars eventually 
recognized an opportunity to claim expertise in this “pure” domain and to justify their claim by 
reference to multiple bodies of prior scholarship.  And as is illustrated by the most recent article 
in the study, Cass Sunstein’s Chevron Step Zero,159 “fractalization” has continued to occur even 
within this new subfield:  over time, the most visible articles on the topic have increasingly 
focused on analyzing components of the Chevron “two-step” rather than the doctrine’s place 
within the legal system.          
The appearance of this subfield, then, may be as much a product of forces mostly internal 
to the academy as of forces clearly outside it, like the Chevron decision itself.  This aspect of 
their activity has remained largely unseen by the academics involved, who remain preoccupied 
with the issues that divided Thayer and Holmes:  the tension between subjective and objective 
conceptions of verbal and legal meaning, and more fundamentally, the appropriate scope of 
interpretive authority and the location of interpretive expertise.  
 
IV.  CITATION PATTERNS AND PRACTICES  
More general features of the group of articles covered in this study include the citation 
links between the articles on the list, and the network created by these links, addressed in this 
Part.160  The characteristics of this network confirm that academics themselves continue to treat 
                                                 
156 See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
157 See ABBOTT, supra note 63, at 22. 
158 Id. at 130, 230-31. 
159 Sunstein, supra note 142. 
160 Most studies of citation networks begin by collecting all articles published on a particular topic during a 
particular period.  For the present study, this would be all articles published on general topics in legal interpretation 
between 1893 and 2010.  The absence of machine indexing of the kind needed made this approach impossible for 
18-Feb-11] LEGAL INTERPRETATION SCHOLARSHIP 30 
 
scholarship on legal interpretation as a coherent research area.  It also reinforces the conclusions 
suggested in the previous Part:  even though, at certain points, this scholarship has been read 
mostly by other scholars, many of those working in the area seem to lack an accurate sense of the 
overall shape of their field and the implications this context has for their asserted aims.  
   
A.  Cross-Citation and Embeddedness 
To analyze the citation relationships among the articles, I identified all citations to prior 
articles by subsequent articles in the group and divided the 154 articles into four categories, 
based on the type of legal instrument addressed by each article.  The two largest categories 
contain articles addressing constitutional interpretation (44 articles) and statutory interpretation 
(67 articles).  A small group contains articles addressing contract interpretation (6 articles).  
About a fifth of the articles explicitly consider multiple types of legal text or the nature of verbal 
meaning in general as it relates to legal practices (37 articles).  
The citation links among the articles in the whole list and in different subcategories create 
a “directed” network, one in which the connections between members of the population are one-
way.161  Directed networks differ from nondirected ones.  In a nondirected network, connections 
between members are symmetrical.  A telephone network is an example:  if I can call you on the 
phone, you can call me.  In a directed network, like a citation network, the existence of a link 
between two members does not enable both linked members equally:  if my article cites your 
article, it does not necessarily follow that your article cites my article.  In a directed network, one 
can not only identify the most-linked articles, but also, among other things, compare articles’ 
outgoing connections (their citations of other articles), or “outdegree,” and their incoming 
connections (citations of them by others), or “indegree.”162   
As Appendix B shows, the articles as a group form a single connected network (with a 
few entirely isolated members).  Although articles in each subcategory tend to be most connected 
to others in the same subcategory, no subcategory is entirely isolated.  This feature of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
this study.  A smaller study may still be valuable, since citation networks are scale-free in most regards.  See supra 
notes 68.  In assessing characteristics of this network, I adjusted my conclusions to take the limited size of the 
population into account.  
161 See, e.g., Newman, supra note 70, at 173, 176-78. 
162 See, e.g., id. 
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network might suggest that legal academics generally assume, with Holmes and Monaghan, that 
different actors’ determinations of the meanings of different kinds of legal texts are comparable 
activities.  But the network’s interconnectedness is probably also a record of the kind of 
“jurisdictional” competition theorized by Abbott163 and evidence that the dynamics of legal 
scholarship in this area differ from that in some others.164  Institutional pressures impel scholars 
to divide their topics into increasingly smaller and more abstract bits, but at the same time to tie 
their work to existing literature as broadly as possible.   
These observations are supported by consideration of the articles’ in- and outdegree 
characteristics.165  Although the article with the highest indegree (cited by other articles in the list 
the greatest number of times) was in the constitutional law category,166 16 of the 20 articles with 
the highest indegree167 were in the statutory interpretation category,168 and more than half of the 
20 articles with the highest outdegree were in the same category.169  This dominance is partly 
due to the size of the statutory interpretation subcategory, its prevalence since the 1980s,170 and 
the fact that over the past several decades, the average number of citations per article has been 
growing.  But the indegree of the most highly cited articles is disproportionate to their numerical 
dominance.  Over time, articles within the theoretical core of this research area seem to be citing 
each other more frequently, across subcategory lines.  The often-noted increasing length and 
number of citations of law review articles might reflect not just a kind of arms race171 but also 
                                                 
163 See supra notes 157159 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra notes 102107 and accompanying text. 
165 To approximate the articles’ in- and outdegrees, the number of links to other articles in the group was 
divided by the number of possible links to other articles in the group.  This denominator was different for each 
article depending on its place in the sequence of articles.  This method was used even though, occasionally, articles 
in the group cited articles with publication dates following those of the citing articles. 
166 Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1029 (1977).   
167 Of the 13 articles with an indegree of zero (i.e., cited by no other articles in the list), eight were published 
since 2000, six in the statutory interpretation category.   
168 Of the other 4 articles with high indegree, 2 were in the constitutional category and 2 in the “multiple” 
category.  Many of these articles were written by authors who self-cite extensively.  Self-citation may be a 
complicating factor in analyzing citation networks but is often ignored.  It is impossible to tell whether a particular 
self-citation is strategic or genuine; there is no reason to penalize productive generators of network members just for 
being productive; and a generator of network members will rarely be so productive as to single-handedly control the 
shape of the network.   
169 12 of the 20 articles with the highest outdegree were in the legislation category, 5 in the constitutional 
category, and 3 in the “multiple” category. 
170 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
171 See Austin, supra note 40, at 1143. 
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the increasing complexity of the terrain within which some legal academics are trying to stake 
out their conceptual territory.  In the absence of an institutional consensus on the shape and aims 
of legal scholarship, as each writer seeks to ground a new work’s claim to relevance and 
legitimacy, the writer has to invoke a constantly increasing number of reference points.  
A similar story seems to be told by another feature of the network:  the relationship 
between articles’ rate of citation by other articles in the study and their rate of citation overall.  
Articles with a higher measure on this feature would seem to be relatively more visible to other 
scholars working on general legal interpretation topics (more deeply embedded in the core 
theoretical part of the field), and relatively less visible (or useful) to scholars working on specific 
topics in legal interpretation (e.g., advocating a particular understanding of a particular text) or in 
other areas.  The articles with the highest measure on this feature were disproportionately 
produced during the 1982 to 1991 period discussed above172 and overlap only minimally with the 
articles on the list that have earned the greatest number of judicial citations.173  In other words, 
much of the most visible scholarship produced during that fruitful period has earned its citations 
disproportionately from other jurisdiction-defining work on general topics in interpretation, 
rather than from the scholarly community at large or from judicial citation.  The claim to 
authority to define interpretive expertise in these theoretical works has become self-fulfilling, 
primarily within a closed community of academics. 
 
B.  Macro-Patterns and Micro-Rhetoric 
This, of course, is the fear of many legal academics and the charge made by many of their 
critics.174  Understanding how legal scholarship fits into the wider disciplinary field could go far 
toward addressing these fears and criticisms by helping to clarify the actual shape of that 
scholarship as a literature.  As noted in Part II, this is exactly what some bibliometric work tries 
to do.  The work done on legal scholarship so far has proposed that in certain areas, this 
                                                 
172 Of the 21 articles with the highest measure on this feature, 16 were published between 1982 and 1991.  (The 
same period was responsible for a lower proportion of articles overall, 85 of 150.) 
173 The only articles on both lists were Holmes, supra note 117; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In 
the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983); and Richard Pildes, Note, Intent, Clear 
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). 
174 See, e.g., supra note 43. 
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scholarship most resembles “cumulating” scientific scholarship.175  The group of articles 
considered in this study does not fit this pattern.  But there is a tension between the macro-shape 
of the citation network created by these articles and much of the micro-rhetoric they contain. 
In the natural sciences, citation patterns have mostly been found to follow a “research 
front” model consistent with Kuhn’s conception of progress during periods of normal science.  
Plotted on a grid, which registers cited articles in rows and citing articles in columns, with a 
mark at the intersections of citing columns and cited rows, this type of pattern clusters citations 
along the diagonal representing the research front.176  Random citation practices scatter citation 
marks more evenly throughout the triangular portion of the grid; overcitation of foundational 
sources clusters citations along the top rows of the grid.  These two patterns are characteristic of 
the humanities and social sciences.177  As Appendix C shows, overall, the articles considered in 
this study cite other articles in the study in a random-citation pattern, with citations distributed 
throughout the grid.  But during some periods—especially 1982 to 1987 and 1991 to 2000—the 
body of the grid empties out a bit, and citations cluster more along the diagonal.  The overall 
pattern displayed by this particular group of articles, then, confirms Becher’s characterization of 
law as a soft discipline lacking convergence.178  It would make sense for this characterization to 
be especially accurate with respect to subfields of academic law that deal with such abstract and 
contested concepts as textual meaning.   
This conclusion is not surprising, since the field in question has traditionally borrowed 
often and heavily from the humanities.  All the same, most legal scholars, including those writing 
in the areas studied here, adopt a rhetoric more characteristic of the sciences:  the “‘anti-rhetoric’ 
of legal discourse closely parallels the conventional view of modern scientific discourse,” 
overusing abstract grammatical agents and describing power relations mostly in mechanistic 
terms.179  The presence of such rhetoric is probably overdetermined in this specific area.  Not just 
a form of false consciousness, it is a product of the plural normative and discursive systems to 
which legal academics owe allegiance and within which they seek to justify their activities.  Such 
                                                 
175 See supra notes 104105 and accompanying text. 
176 Hargens, supra note 82, at 848. 
177 Id. 
178 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. 
179 Coulson, supra note 106, at 194 (quoting and discussing Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the 
Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 20 (2006)). 
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rhetoric lends scholarly descriptions and prescriptions a “hardness” that can establish and clarify 
legal scholars’ expertise vis-à-vis legal decision makers.  But it is an unstable rhetoric, especially 
in work that by its very nature seeks to both capitalize on and deny the role played by 
interpretation in other academic and professional discourses. 
The result is an “invisible college” that is also a “Tower of Babel.”180  The constant 
churning at the center of this field, which is continually reorienting itself with respect to its own 
foundational texts and other disciplinary vocabularies, exacerbates this dynamic.  As legal 
academics seek to establish their expertise with respect to particular interpretive issues, they 
fracture the field, increasing the opportunities for claiming expertise, but also pin their claims to 
heterogeneous vocabularies, probably making those claims more tenuous.    
 
CONCLUSION 
Legal academics’ willingness to consider the institutional determinants of their scholarly 
output has been oddly limited.  In particular, they have resisted examining what the texts they 
produce have to tell them about the value and nature of their collective efforts.  This resistance is 
especially confounding in the area of scholarship on topics in legal interpretation, in which 
scholarly awareness of the systemic significance of the written word has always been acute.  
American legal academics’ output in this area supports intuitions about the peculiar status of 
legal scholarship among the academic disciplines and in relation to professional legal discourse, 
but also suggests that this status carries special dangers, even as it makes work in this area 
especially attractive.  This article does not hope to offer the last word on the topic, but seeks only 
to persuade readers that systematic analysis of the kind sketched here might help legal academics 
reach more agreement about what their work does and should achieve. 
* * * 
                                                 
180 Cf. Eleanor Marie Brown, The Tower of Babel:  Bridging the Divide Between Critical Race Theory and 
“Mainstream” Civil Rights Scholarship, 103 YALE L.J. 513, 515-16 (1995). 
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APPENDIX A 
MOST-CITED AMERICAN LAW REVIEW ARTICLES ON LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
 
This appendix lists the 154 most-cited articles published in American law reviews on 
general issues in legal interpretation.  It includes studies of interpretive practice and authority, as 
well as analyses of the role of interpretation in legal reasoning and defenses or critiques of 
particular interpretive methods.  It also includes articles focusing on specific categories of legal 
texts (such as contracts, constitutions, and statutes), specific interpreters, and specific interpretive 
principles.  But it does not include articles focusing on the meaning of specific legal texts or on 
specific doctrinal areas, such as the interpretation of environmental statutes. 
The list was compiled from a list of the articles published in American law reviews, 
indexed in Hein Online, containing the word “interpretation,” and cited more than 100 times (by 
Hein Online’s count).  Hein Online was used because of the greater historical coverage of its law 
review database. 
Articles are listed in the order of citation frequency, that is, total number of citations in 
Hein Online.  This list also includes weighted citation information, corresponding to the 
approximate number of citations of the article per year since its publication, based on the 
approximate number of possible citations in an American law review as of the article’s year of 
publication.  Some articles are marked with asterisks.  The number of citations listed for these 
articles is likely underreported because the articles in question, or significant portions of them, 
were later republished in frequently cited books.   
 
Article No. cites Weighted 
1. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (1983).  
1170 1.510 
2. * H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).  
912 .745 
3. * Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1175 (1989).  
833 1.333 
4. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision 
and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be 
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).  
803 .608 
5. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 
47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947).   
779 .577 
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Article No. cites Weighted 
6. Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).   
757 .796 
7. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).   
746 .490 
8. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 
621 (1990).   
730 1.217 
9. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).  
716 .585 
10. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 
87 (1990).   
699 1.165 
11. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).   
682 .941 
12. * Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique 
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 
(1983).  
678 .875 
13. Henry P. Monaghan, The Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).   
662 .696 
14. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Opportunists and Others:  A 
Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989). 
648 1.037 
15. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
739 (1982).  
602 .753 
16. Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation 
through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).   
593 .847 
17. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 
(1930).  
575 .186 
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 
103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).  
568 .909 
19. Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 
(1983).  
533 .688 
20. * William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).   
525 .840 
21. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 
(1986).  
515 .736 
22. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 
(1990).  
512 .853 
23. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).  
504 .593 
24. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511 (1989).  
470 .752 
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Article No. cites Weighted 
25. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 353 (1981).  
436 .528 
26. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).   
407 .678 
27. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in 
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992).  
393 .728 
28. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 
383 (1908).   
380 .254 
29. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 
(1989).   
371 .594 
30. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom 
and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983).  
369 .476 
31. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory 
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).   
364 .639 
32. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).   
345 .531 
33. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative 
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195 
(1983).   
342 .441 
34. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 
971 (1991).  
342 .6 
35. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987).  
334 .495 
36. * Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 
(1982).  
331 .414 
37. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988).   
319 .491 
38. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules As Constitutional 
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).   
316 .585 
39. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 
101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992)  
312 .578 
40. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 
HARV. L. REV. 417 (1899).   
306 .202 
41. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 




42. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).   
295 .381 
43. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).   
294 .612 
44. * Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
469 (1981).   
293 .355 
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45. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implications 
of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 275 (1988).  
292 .449 
46. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: 
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995).   
290 .644 
47. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values In Statutory 
Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989).  
283 .453 
48. James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 
HARV. L. REV. 886 (1930).  
274 .391 
49. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s Guide to 
Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975).  
263 .276 
50. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 
YALE L.J. 743 (1987).   
259 .384 
51. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 
(1999).  
256 .776 
52. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 26 (1994).  
253 .527 
53. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 
(1993).   
246 .482 
54. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 
89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001).   
246 1.025 
55. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1 (1984).   
243 .324 
56. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).   
243 .623 
57. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. 
L. REV. 616 (1949).  
236 .177 
58. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the 
Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 179 (1986).   
236 .337 
59. Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1987).   
232 .344 
60. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and 
Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423 (1988).  
232 .357 
61. Richard Pildes, Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common 
Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 892 (1982).  
226 .283 
62. Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 26 (2000).  
226 .753 
63. Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation In the Administrative 
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (1985).  
225 .310 
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64. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982).  
222 .278 
65. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 
979 (1987).   
220 .326 
66. Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative 
History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United 
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990).   
217 .362 
67. Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 1033 (1981).   
202 .245 
68. Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity 
and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995).   
199 .442 
69. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 
S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985).  
197 .272 
70. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 
82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).   
196 .302 
71. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded 
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and 
Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).  
189 .261 
72. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New 
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence 
in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (1995).   
188 .418 
73. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997).   
187 .479 
74. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative 
History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371 (1987).  
185 .274 
75. Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 
96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987).   
185 .274 
76. * John Hart Ely, Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and 
Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J. 399 (1978).   
183 .206 
77. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659 
(1987).  
182 .270 
78. Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: 
A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 
551 (1985).   
181 .250 
79. Paul Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 
(1982).  
180 .225 
80. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of 
Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory 
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).  
177 .295 
81. John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001).   
175 .648 
82. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).  172 .229 
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83. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).  
169 .260 
84. Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 
151 (1981).  
167 .202 
85. David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory 
Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921 (1992).   
165 .306 
86. Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-
Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the Modern 
Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975).   
163 .171 
87. John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial 
Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996).   
163 .388 
88. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind 
Citizens and the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990)  
162 .270 
89. * Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527 
(1982).  
161 .201 
90. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial 
Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988). 
161 .248 
91. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003).   
161 .767 
92. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon between 
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 
(1989).   
158 .253 
93. Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).   
155 .107 
94. Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, 
Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies 
Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992).   
154 .285 
95. Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a 
Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 297 (1977).   
149 .163 
96. Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, 
Representation as Text:  Towards an Ethnography of Legal 
Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1991).  
146 .27 
97. Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of 
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964).   
142 .125 
98. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure 
of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991).   
141 .247 
99. Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of 
Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1995).   
141 .313 
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100. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. 
REV. 641 (1923).   
139 .013 
101. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990).   
138 .230 
102. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and 
the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1983).  
136 .175 
103. Gerald C. MacCallum Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 
(1966).  
135 .122 
104. Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the 
Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978).  
134 .151 
105. Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law As a Canon 
of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103 
(1990).  
134 .223 
106. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 1509 (1998) (book review).   
132 .367 
107. * Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and 
Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986).   
131 .187 
108. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an 
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 
(1989). 
130 .208 
109. Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. 
REV. 940 (1923).   
129 .090 
110. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State 
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993).   
129 .253 
111. Frederick Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 
UCLA L. REV. 797 (1982).  
128 .160 
112. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: 
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
533 (1992).  
127 .235 
113. E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 
YALE L.J. 939 (1967).  
126 .115 
114. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. 
L. REV. 611 (1999).   
126 .382 
115. Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive 
Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (1991).  
124 .218 
116. Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution 
Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977).  
123 .135 
117. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 
165 (1985).   
123 .170 
118. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 
(2006).  
123 1.367 
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119. David L. Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding: 
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991).   
122 .214 
120. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional 
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991). 
121 .212 
121. Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).   
121 .252 
122. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” 
New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).  
119 .209 
123. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation 
of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International 
Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479 (1998).  
119 .331 
124. Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).  
118 .189 
125. * Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in 
Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982).  
116 .145 
126. Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A 
Turn for the Worse, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989).  
115 .184 
127. Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & 
Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821 (1990).  
115 .192 
128. Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing 
Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations 
of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994).  
115 .240 
129. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Word and the River:  Pedagogy as 
Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2231 (1992). 
115 .213 
130. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the 
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 
231 (1990).   
113 .188 
131. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The 
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
241 (1992).   
112 .207 
132. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997).   
112 .287 
133. Charles P. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation, 3 
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APPENDIX B 
GRAPH OF CITATION NETWORK 
 
The draft graph below displays the citation connections among the articles in Appendix 
A.  It was created using Gephi, an open-source graph visualization software package that allows 
the creation and analysis of directed social-network graphs.  (Additional detail can be added to 
the graph to clarify the relations among subcategories of articles.)     
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APPENDIX C 
CITATION REFERENCE GRAPH 
 
This graph also shows the citation relations among the articles listed in Appendix A.  
Each row represents an article available for citation, ordered chronologically from top to bottom.  
Each column represents an article that could have made citations of another article in the 
appendix.  An “X” marks the spot where each article listed in a column cites any prior articles 
listed in the rows.  Thus, the patterns of citation over time may be read from left to right in the 
graph.   
 
 
 
 
